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L Latin America
A. NAFrA/Larn AwMECAN OVERVIEW
Although passage of the NAFTA represented a significant achievement by the signato-
ry countries, confficting perspectives taken by the United States and Mexico regarding the
accession of other signatories to the NAFTA have forced South and Central American
nations to aggressively pursue other international trade alliances. On May 2, 1994, Mexican
Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development, Jaime Sierra Puche, asserted that
Mexico supported enlarging the NAFTA as a means of expanding the free trade area in
Latin America and not new bilateral pacts. 1 Sierra told a Council of the Americas
Conference on Hemispheric Integration that Mexico has proposed creating an "accession
annex" for each country joining NAFTA that would focus on market access and take
account of a particular country's level of economic development.2 Speaking at the same
conference, United States' Trade Representative Mickey Kantor reaffirmed the Clinton
Administration's commitment to negotiate the next free trade agreement with Chile, and
restated that accession for Chile to the NAFTA was a distinct possibility.3
However, it is now apparent that neither of these policies will come into being in the
near future, largely due to uncertainty over the level of commitment of the United States
to trade liberalization in Latin America. As Mexican officials had indicated prior to the
above referenced conference, Mexico is pursuing free trade areas and other regional inte-
gration efforts, including Mexican Free Trade Agreement's (FTA's) with other Latin
American countries, the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) (consisting of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and the Andean Pact (consisting of Peru,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela), through the Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI). 4 Mexican policy in this direction was recently demonstrated by its
participation as a signatory to the Group of Three free trade agreement with Colombia
and Venezuela.5 Policy statements made by various Mexican trade officials have made dear
that Mexico desires to become a hub for Latin American investment with free trade access
to the United States, Canadian and Latin American markets. 6
Conversely, Kantor asserted on September 13, 1994, that the Clinton administration
had withdrawn its proposal to indude a provision to extend "fast-track" negotiating author-
ity in legislation being drafted to implement the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agree-
ment.7 The Uruguay Round was successfully concluded in December 1993 after more than
1.1 Inside NAFTA No. 9 p. 1 (May 4, 1994).
2. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.18 p. 699 (May 4, 1994).
3. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 700.
4. 1 Inside NAFrA No. 5, p. 1, 12 (Mar. 9, 1994).
5. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, p. 945 (June 15, 1994).
6. Reuter Textlne, Euromoney Trade Fin. & Banker Int'l, South America: South American Trade Angles
(June 30, 1994), available on LEXIS.
7. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36 p. 1388 (Sept. 14, 1994).
seven years of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
signed by 108 countries in April 1994.8 In addressing reporters after a meeting with private
business groups that support the legislation called the "Alliance for GATT NOW," Kantor
stated that "To risk bipartisanship [with the Uruguay Round legislation] when the timing
wasn't necessary now seemed to us not to be appropriate..' 9 The United States' decision
resulted in placing any bilateral or NAFTA accession plan with Chile and other Latin
American signatories on hold indefinitely; and, despite its reassurances of future integration
to Chile, 10 has left the other Latin American countries foreclosed from any imminent
attempts to accede to the NAFTA and thus reverse the trend towards closer hemispheric
economic integration." 1 This reversal is made apparent from examining the regional multi-
lateral and bilateral trade agreements recently entered into force or modified in the Latin
American arena.
B. LATIN AMERCAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. MERCOSUR
a. Ratification of Common External Tariff Accords
On August 5, 1994, the common external tariffs of the MERCOSUR were ratified by
the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.12 The great majority of the
common external tariffs on approximately 9,000 types of goods will come into force in
January 1995, thus enabling MERCOSUR to pass from a free trade zone to a customs
union.13 In Agreement No. 7 of the Common Market Council, the four presidents ratified
that the common capital tariffs for capital goods imported from external MERCOSUR
countries are fixed at 14% by 2001 for Brazil and Argentina, and by 2006 for Paraguay and
Uruguay.14 The group's top common external tariffs for information systems and telecom-
munications products will be 16%, but these begin in 2006.15
For all MERCOSUR member countries, products having 60% of locally manufactured
components will be considered of national origin with the possibility of free access to the
MERCOSUR nations.16 Paraguay will consider products with a 50-50 proportion of
national and imported components as of national origin by 2001.17 All capital goods hav-
ing 80% locally produced items will be considered as MERCOSUR-originated. 18 In addi-
tion, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay each will have 300 exceptions to the common external
8. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16 p. 610 (Apr. 20, 1994).
9. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 7, at 1388.
10. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37 p. 1442 (Sept. 21, 1994).
11. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38 p. 1504 (Sept. 28, 1994).
12. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33 p. 1268 (Aug. 17, 1994).






tariffs outside of the telecommunications, computers and other capital goods areas. 19
Paraguay will be allowed 399 exceptions. 20
b. Expanding the Coverage of a South American Free Trade Area
For all practical purposes, the MERCOSUR is likely to expand faster than the NAFTA.
The MERCOSUR presidents' meeting was also attended by Chilean President, Eduardo
Frei, and Bolivian Vice President, Hugo Cardenas Conde, who were formally invited as
official observers because of their countries' expressed interest in establishing a closer asso-
ciation with the economic bloc.2 1 In fact, Chile's recent proposal to set up a free trade part-
nership with the MERCOSUR countries would broaden the coverage of a South American
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) beyond the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for
goods originally proposed and subsequently modified by Brazil earlier in 1994.22 The pro-
posal indicates that Chile desires any regional free-trade area in which it participates to
encompass trade in services, as well as protection of intellectual property rights and the
environment.23 Its more comprehensive coverage makes Chile's proposed association with
MERCOSUR more like the NAFTA. The June 8 proposal would eliminate barriers to trade
over ten years, and calls for Chile and each MERCOSUR nation to set "bilateral tariff-elim-
ination schedules that would respond to the specific conditions and sensitivities in the
bilateral relationship."24 Last year Chile exported goods and services worth US $1.1 billion
to and imported US $1.8 billion from the four MERCOSUR nations. 25 Chile's talks with
the MERCOSUR were scheduled to end in December 1994.26
Another result of the Presidents' meeting in August was the issuance of a special decla-
ration on encouraging closer trade and economic ties with the European Union (EU). 27
The presidents of the MERCOSUR countries asserted that the European experience was
the most important and valuable example for MERCOSUR to follow in deciding to inte-
grate their economies, thus ratifying their nations' readiness to intensify economic links
with the EU.28 The European Union members have expressed interest in developing closer
economic relations with MERCOSUR, but upon the condition that MERCOSUR success-
fully shift from an agreement on trade preferences to a customs union with common
external tariffs, which is scheduled to be institutionalized by January 1995.29 Hence, at a
19. 1 Inside NAFTA No. 16 p. 15 (Aug. 10, 1994).
20. Inside NAFrA, supra note 19, at 15.
21. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 12, at 1268.
22. 1 Inside NAFTA No. 11, p. 6-8 (June 1, 1994) (See Unofficial Translation of Initial Brazilian
Proposal to MERCOSUR for SAFTA).
23. 1 Inside NAFTA No. 13, p. 1, 13 (June 29, 1994). See also Unofficial Translation of Chilean
Proposal to MERCOSUR, Id. at 14-15.
24. Inside NAFTA, supra note 23, at 13.
25. See Latin America Regional Reports: Mexico and Central America, THE MERCOSUR, Thinking
Big the Brazilian Counterweight, p. 2 (Sept. 29, 1994), available on LEXIS.
26. THE MERCOSUR, supra note 25, at 2.
27. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 12, at 1268-69.
28. Id.
29. Id.
July 7 press conference, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Guido Di Tella, said "Now when
MERCOSUR makes a customs union a reality on January 1, 1995, we can start up negotia-
tions with the EU right away. We do not give away any advantage to this or that group in
negotiations, but the possibility of creating a free-trade zone with the EU is now more
important for us than to create such a zone with the NAFTA countries' 30
2. "Group of Three" Free Trade Zone
On July 13, 1994 the presidents of the "Group of Three" - Mexico, Colombia and
Venezuela - signed a treaty to create a free trade zone among the three countries (G-3). 3 1
The G-3 agreement is scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 1995. According to a
Colombian Embassy announcement, the three nations have a combined domestic GNP of
US $487 billion and a total population of 144 million persons.32 The G-3, over a period of
ten years, eliminates tariff barriers for all goods traded among the three countries except
for automobiles, which will be integrated over 12 years. 33
a. Trade Sectors Covered by the G-3 Treaty
Apparently modeled after the NAFTA, the G-3 contains dispute resolution mecha-
nisms and provisions on market access, rules of origin, foreign investment, government
procurement, intellectual property and agricultural trade, and builds on a trade agreement
established between Colombia and Venezuela in 1991. 34 According to the Latin American
Integration Association, in 1993 Mexico exported US $259.5 million worth of goods to
Colombia and US $198.6 million to Venezuela, and imported US $80.1 million from
Colombia and US $182.0 million from Venezuela. 35 Trade flow to Colombia from
Venezuela totalled US $697.1 million in 1993, and trade flow from Venezuela to Colombia
totalled US $968.1 million.36 Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, Juan Manuel Santos,
called the pact "the most important in our history. It's another step toward the formation
of a giant free trade zone involving all of Latin America."37 He noted that Colombia will
also begin negotiations on joining the MERCOSUR before the end of 1994.38 After the
NAFTA, G-3 represents the second largest trading bloc in the Americas.
However, the G-3 countries must still resolve differences in rules of origin for textiles
and apparel products. The Venezuelans wanted a less-strict type of rule used by the
Andean Pact, while Mexico insisted on the NAFTA-type "yarn forward" rule. Under the
"yarn forward" rule, all textiles and apparel that would receive eventual duty-free treat-
ment would have to be composed of yarn, cloth and other major components made in the
region.39 Colombia accepted the Mexican origin-rules methodology, but required quota-
30. Id.








39. Inside NAFTA, supra note 22, at 11-12.
like tariff preference levels with Mexico, which would allow it to export increasing
amounts of textiles and apparel that use some materials imported from outside the G-3
over the first five years of the pact.40 The signatory countries expect to resolve these differ-
ences by the end of 1994.
Overall, the G-3 agreement means an immediate average 35% tariff cut for
Venezuelan and Colombian exports destined for Mexico and an immediate average 21%
cut for Mexican products headed to those countries. 41 Besides the automotive, textiles and
apparel sectors, the only other sector not completely covered by the G-3 is the agricultural
sector. In agriculture, import-sensitive products would not be induded in the pact in the
short-term, and their future incorporation into the tariff-phaseout schedule will depend
on the elimination of trade-distorting measures in the three countries. 42 For example,
Venezuelan and Colombian farm goods that are protected by systems of price-bands are
excluded from G-3, as are Mexican products that benefit from production subsidies, such
as those provided by the rural credit program PROCAMPO.43 The G-3 also includes a
commitment to eliminate subsidies for all the farm exports for which tariffs are being
eliminated over a transition period. 44
b. Effects of G-3 on United States' Companies
Subsidiaries of U.S. companies will apparently have no difficulty meeting the require-
ments of the G-3. It is expected that subsidiaries with production centers in just one of the
three countries - such as General Motors of Mexico - will take full advantage of the
treaty to increase market participation. 45 Most experts agreed that the G-3's rules of ori-
gin, which were modeled directly on those in the NAFTA, avert any threat of Latin
American products entering the U.S. market free of duty, by way of transhipment.46 Rene
Espinosa Torres, Director of External Trade for the Confederation of Mexico's Industrial
Chambers, said Mexican producers were "very insistent" that their government's bilateral
and trilateral agreements be similar to the NAFTA. Espinosa said that less than 10% of the
NAFTA's rules of origin for Mexico's 11,800 tariff items needed to be changed for the G-3
accord. Thus, almost all manufacturers will be able to simultaneously comply with the
provisions of NAFTA and the G-3 accord with a single line of production.47
C. UNuATERAL AGREEMENTS OF NAFA SIGNATORIES IN LATIN AMERICA
1. Mexico: Mexico - Costa Rica Free-Trade Accord
Mexico and Costa Rica successfully concluded three years of negotiations aimed at






45. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, p. 1051 (June 29, 1994).
46. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 45, at 1051.
47. Id& at 1052.
as well as investment, intellectual property protection and government procurement
beginning January 1, 1995.48 The Mexico - Costa Rica pact will eliminate tariffs immedi-
ately on 8,500 of 12,000 tariff lines traded between the two nations. Until March 1994, the
countries had been at odds over the origin rules that would govern which products and
services received the benefits of the accord. Costa Rica, whose maquiladora industries for
production of textiles and apparel use many foreign inputs, wanted a less stringent origin
rule than imposed in the NAFTA (e.g. requiring that at least 50% of the value of the good
be produced within a free-trade area itself) so that those goods would qualify for eventual
duty-free treatment.49 To bridge this gap, negotiating teams from the two countries main-
tained the NAFTA-level regional content requirements, but created a system for seeking
exemptions from those requirements. Mexican Commerce Undersecretary, Herminio
Blanco, stated that "if an input is not available either at the right prices, quality, quantity or
terms of delivery, then such an exemption can be sought'S0 Under the arrangement, a
committee known as CIRI will hear such appeals from Costa Ricans or Mexicans for a
temporary waiver from the origin rules if they cannot obtain a component under the
proper conditions. 5 1
2. United States: Argentina to Negotiate for Bilateral Pact
Argentine Secretary of State for Foreign Economic Relations, Jorge Campbell, stated
on September 13, 1994, that Argentina is prepared to enter into bilateral trade negotiations
with the Clinton Administration or join the NAFTA "as soon as possible" in spite of its
participation in the MERCOSUR.5 2 One of the primary issues of consideration is the
interpretation of the Treaty of Asuncion, the founding document of MERCOSUR, signed
by the four South American governments in 1991. Argentina is arguing that the transition
period toward a common market outlined in that document will continue past January 1,
1995, when the customs union covering 85% of trade enters into effect. 53 United States
and Argentine officials noted that technically, under the president's agreement reached by
MERCOSUR on August 5, 1994, a comprehensive customs union featuring the common
external tariff for all products would not be reached until 2006, although Brazil and other
observers considered the January 1, 1995 date to mark the end of the transition period.5 4
During the transition period, Article Eight of the Treaty of Asuncion states that Argentina
can negotiate bilaterally on trade matters with third countries that are not members of the
ALADI so long as "any benefit, franchise, immunity or privilege granted to" products from
those third countries is also granted to its MERCOSUR members.55 Both U.S. and
Argentine officials portrayed the new Argentine statement as part of an effort to retain
flexibility in its trade relations until the Clinton Administration delineates its view on




52. 1 Inside NAFTA No. 19, p. 4 (Sept. 21, 1994).
53. Inside NAFTA, supra note 52, at 7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
hemispheric trade integration, which became muddled when the Clinton Administration
dropped its request that "fast-track" negotiating authority for future free-trade pacts be
induded in the Uruguay Round implementing bill. 56
D. LATIN AmRcAN PERSPECwEw NomS AND EVETS
1. South American Transportation Pact
The presidents of Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay signed a plan on September 25, 1994, to
create a land/river transportation corridor linking South America's Atlantic and Pacific
coasts to stimulate interest in a possible future merger of the MERCOSUR and the Andean
PacL 57 The impact that such a transport corridor could have on South American integra-
tion has been a key issue ever since Bolivia and Peru signed the Bi-Oceanic Intercon-
nection Project Treaty.58 The project would create a road link from the southern Peruvian
port of Ilo to Paraguay and a more efficient system of river transit to the Atlantic port of
Mar de Plata, Uruguay. The three presidents signed a 20-point memorandum creating a
trinational coordination unit to oversee planning of the project, ensuring a mechanism
under which funding and development issues are to be analyzed. 59
2. Columbian and Trade Accords and Preferences
On June 14,1994 Colomnbia and the 13-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
concluded negotiations on an agreement on trade, economic, and technical cooperation. 60
The agreement, scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1995, will be implemented in three
stages. First, a list of CARICOM exports to Colombia would receive immediate duty-free
entry. Second, a gradual dismantling of tariffs on other CARICOM goods would occur
over a period of three years. Third, after the three-year term, the parties will negotiate
Colombia's tariff liberalization as well as tariff concessions Colombia will receive from five
major Caribbean nations (e.g. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, and the
Bahamas), according to the U.S. Commerce Department.6 1 The rule of origin adopted in
the agreement is a 40% regional content for goods receiving preferential treatment.62
Furthermore, Colombia is apparently giving more priority to maximizing the trade
benefits it receives under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) than to gaining access to
the NAFTA.63 Colombia will enjoy greater access to the U.S. than to Mexico for at least
eight years in many areas because of the ATPA, and thus Colombian officials believe that
"early accession to the NAFTA is not immediately essential for market access" 64 In addi-
56. Id
57. Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), South America, South American Transportation Pact Heightens Interest in
Trade Integration (Oct. 6, 1994).
58. Int'l Trade Daily, supra note 57.
59. Id
60. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, p. 993 (June 22, 1994).
61. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 60, at 993.
62. Id.
63. 1 Inside NAFTA No. 15, p. 11 (July 27, 1994).
64. Inside NAFTA, supra note 63, at 11.
tion, Colombia's immediate trade priority with the U.S. will be "to make these Andean pref-
erences work maximally to their advantage. 6 5 The unilateral trade benefit program allows
for expanded duty-free entry into the U.S., and is similar to, but not as broad as, the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative. Other countries in the ATPA program, enacted in 1991, are Bolivia,
Ecuador and Peru. The Colombian officials also noted that the appointment of Myles
Frechette, a U.S. official with a strong trade policy background, to be the next U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia, was an indication that the U.S. was serious in trying to negotiate
an intellectual property protection agreement with Colombia, as well as one on
investment. 66
3. Peru Regains Foreign Investment Preference in Restructuring and Privatization Program
Foreign investment in Peru has increased dramatically due to the country's radical
economic restructuring program, the implementation of Latin America's widest-reaching
privatization program, and recent political stability.67 As of May 1994, US $1.69 billion in
foreign investments have been registered with the government's foreign investment and
technology commission, known by the Spanish acronym CONITE, the majority of which
have been centered on the key mining and petroleum industries.68 The other major
sources of capital are investments in the Peruvian capital markets, which have amounted
to more than US $500 million in foreign money invested on the Lima Stock Exchange, and
the US $2.02 billion that Telefonica de Espana, the Spanish telecommunications leader,
offered during a privatization auction for the Peruvian telephone system, that as of May
1994 had not yet been registered. 69 The privatization program leapt forward in May 1994
with the sale of the Centromin mining/smelting complex, the largest in Peru, for almost
US $300 million. Other privatizations scheduled for late 1994 include ElectroLima, the
state electricity firm supplying the Peruvian capital; Petroperu, the government's petrole-
um monopoly; and InterBanc, the state-owned financial and banking entity.70 The
Peruvian government has signed more than 20 bilateral and multilateral agreements guar-
anteeing the safety of foreign investment in Peru in the past year, a confidence-building
gesture that Peruvian officials assert should convince the international business communi-
ty of the government's seriousness. Peru's -reinsertion into the financial community has
been met with enthusiasm, and foreign officials have noted that Peru currently enjoys the
highest growth rate in Latin America. 7 1
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, p. 654.
68. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 67, at 654.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
